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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, (
, Case No.
10408

vs.

I

ADONIS ROGER BURCH,
Defendant and Appellant.

r
1
)

I

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Adonis Roger Burch, appeals from
a conYiction of the crime of second degree burglary in
tl1e District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge.
DISPOSITION IN THE LU\iVER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with
the crime of second degree burglary. The appellant
1

filed a demand for a bill of particulars to which in
answer and supplemental answer were filed. Thereafter
an additional demand for a bill of particulars was file(;
and an answer filed thereto. At the time of trial, tht
appellant was tried with Kenneth Dale Hulse in a ioint
trial by jury. The jury returned a verdict of "gu,ilt/
and the appellant was committed to the Utah State
Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the appellant's con·
viction should be affirmed.

STATE_MENT OF FACTS
Respondent submits the following statement of '
facts as being a more correct statement of what actual!\' \
occurred at the time of trial and more properly in keep·
ing with the rule that the evidence on appeal will be 1
viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. ,
On January 21, 1965, Wren B. Egan, the Comp· 1
troller of 'Vheeler :Machinery Company, locked !ID ,
office in the office accounting area at the Wheeler Com·
pany premises at Second West and Twenty-first South
in Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 40) . His office also con·
tained the vault and in the vault was a safe (Tr. 41).
The offices were closed and locked each night (Tr. 45).
The janitor locks the office when he leaves (Tr. 57).
2

\Verner P. Christensen, the janitor, was the only employee of "\Vheeler Machinery Company authorized to
go into l\lr. Egan's office after closing (Tr. 70).

l\Ir. Egan left at approximately 5 :30 p.m. on
J auuary 20, 1965. At approximately 1 :30 a.m. on
J anuarv 21, 1965, he returned to the premises at the
request of the police. His office window had been
broken out, dust, mortar and bricks had been pulled
from the wall area, and various tools which had not been
present at the time he left, were found in his office.
Mr. 'Verner P. Christensen, the janitor for
"'heeler Machinery Company locked the office area at
10:15 p.m. He checked the doors at 'Vheeler Machinery
Company and noticed that there was no one else around.
This was approximately 10 :30 p.m. (Tr. 75-77). There
are eight entrances into 'Vheeler Machinery Company
by which anyone seeking normal access could have entered, most of them were kept locked after the normal
business hours.
At approximately 12 :30 a.m. on the morning of
the 21st of January, 1965, Jack Merrick, a private night
1
ratchman went to the 'Vheeler Machinery Company
premises to check the area (Tr. 80) . He had previously
cheeked the area three times earlier that evening and
at approximately 10 :30 p.m. he noticed that only the
janitor was on the premises (Tr. 103). Mr. Merrick
entered the front door of the 'Vheeler :Machinery premises and upon entry, heard pounding (Tr. 81). He
looked over towards Mr. Egan's office and noticed the
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window was broken and that the safe light over the
vault was on (Tr. 81). He immediately went to the
telephone and called the Salt Lake City Police. Almost
immediately thereafter, he observed three men comt
running out of the area from the direction of Mr. Egan's
office. One of them ran into the shop area by soml
overhanging doors. Two of the men ran into the rest.
room area (Tr. 84) . l\fr. :Merrick identified the appel·
lant Burch as being one of the men who ran into the
restroom. l\'lerrick fired his pistol as the men ran by.
Almost immediately thereafter, Officer Lynn J. Lund
of the Salt Lake City Police Department arrived (Tr.
107) . He chased a man north into the shop area and
the man ran out the back door. He returned to the
restroom area where he noticed Burch and his accomplice, Kenneth Dale Hulse, in the restroom. Burch 1rn
crouched in the corner and Hulse had his hands up
against the wall.
Officer Edward Barton, who also come to the
scene of the burglary, said that he opened door No. 8
with his pocket knife (Tr. 125) by merely lifting the
lock. Officer Floyd Ledford testified that he saw a ·
person run out of the 'Vheeler Machinery area and he
fired a shot at him but lost him (Tr. 139).
There is no evidence of any kind to indicate that
the appellant was other than a trespasser on the pre·
mises, and Mr. Wren Egan testified that no one was
allowed in his off ice after working hours except the
janitor (Tr. 57-70).
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Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned
a yerdict of guilty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INFORMATION IS JURISDICTIONALLY SUFFICIENT TO CHARGE
THE APPELLANT vVITH THE CRIME
FOR \VHICH HE \VAS CONVICTED AND
MINOR IRREGULARITIES IN THE INFORMATION PROYIDE NO BASIS FOR
REYERSAL lVHERE THERE WAS NO
CHALLENGE TO THE INFORMATION AT
THE TIME OF TRIAL.
There is noting in the record in the instant case
which shows that the appellant made any motion at the
time of trial to quash or otherwise challenge the sufficiency of the Information. The answers to the appeliant's demands for a Bill of Particulars indicated that
the State did not contend that the appellant broke into
Wheeler Machinery Company in the sense that there
was any physical damage to the victim's property, but
did contend that there was an illegal entry and by an
unlawful means (Tr. 38). The Information actually
filed again the appellant read:
"The defendants, ADONIS R 0 GER
BURCH and KENNETH DALE HULSE,
having been duly committed to this Court by J.
5

PATTON NF.ELEY, a committing magistrate
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to answer
to this charge, are accused by JAY E. BANKS
Ditsrict Attorney of the Third Judicial Dis~
trict, in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, by this Information of the crime of BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 9, Section 3, Ptah
Code Annotated, 1953, as follows, to-wit:
That on or about the 21st day of January,

1965, at the County of Salt Lake, State of

Utah, the said ADONIS ROGER BURCH
and KENNETH DALE HULSE entered
the building of Wheeler Machinery Company,
a corporation, in the nighttime with intent to
commit larceny therein;
contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the
State aforesaid, in such cases made and pwrided,
and against the peace and dignity of the State
of Utah."
The appellant contends that this is insufficient because
it does not charge that there was a forceable breaking
and entering or an entry without force through an open
door or window or other aperture. There is no merit to
this proposition. Section 77-21-8, Utah Code .Annotated, 1953, states:
" ( 1) The information of indictment may
charge, and is valid am] sufficient if it char~es
the offense for which the defendant is bemg
prosecuted in one or more of the following 'lt'll/JS:
(a) By using the name given to the offense
by the common law or by a stafote.

6

(b) By stating so much of the definition of
the offense, either in terms of the common law
or of the statute defining the offense or in
terms of substantially the same meaning, as
is sufficient to give the court and the defendant notice of what offense is intended to be
charged.
(2) The information or indictment may refer
to a section or subsection of any statute creating
the offense charged therein, and in determining
the validity or sufficiency of such information
or indictment regard shall be had to such ref erence. "

Contrary to the appellant's statement in his brief, the
Information in this case mentioned the common law
erime of burglary and expressly indicated in statutory
language that the crime charged was Burglary in the
Second Degree. Obviously, the charge as set forth in
the Information was sufficient to appraise the appellant
that he was being charged with Burglary in the Second
Degree. It alleged the time and the place of the commission of the offense and indicated that there was an
entry into the building in the nighttime. The Bill of
Particulars filed by the State made it clear that although
physical damage was not alleged, an illegal or improper
entry was alleged which would be sufficient to constitute
a breaking. It is obvious that the appellant was clearly
informed of the crime with which he was charged.
Appellant's statement that the State should have
charged in accordance with the form set forth in Section
77-21-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is without merit.

In State v. Spencer, IOI Utah 274, 121 P.2d 912

7

(1942), this Court noted that the forms of Information
to be used in cases where applicable as set forth in the
above mentioned Section are merely exemplary a!Hl are
not intended to bind the prosecution nor are they necessarily sufficient if they do not include the elements or the
name of the particular offense. See also State v. Spencer,
101 Utah 27 4, 117 P .2d 455 ( 1942). In the latter case
the Court referring to the provisions of Section 77-21·8.
Utah Code Annotated, H)53, stated:
"Conformance with either of these three per·
missive ways of charging the offense would han
apprised the court and the defendant of what
offense was intended to be charged so the plea
could be entered, defense prepared and the pen·
alty be known and opposed, if such steps beeame
necessary."
Consequently, since in the instant case the charge was
sufficient because the name given of the offense was the
common law name and the name given was by statute
proper, the appellant was adequately apprised of tlie
charge against him. This being jurisdictionally sntfi·
cient, the conviction may be affirmed.
In State v. Robins, 102 Utah 119, 127 P.2d 10.J.2
(1942), this Court ruled that an Information employing
the word "robbed" was sufficient to sustain the charge
of robbery, even though the Information did not charge
the taking to the use of force and fear. A similar con·
clusion was reached in State v. Avery, 102 Utah 3:i.
125 P.2d 803 (1942), where the use of the word ''mur·
dered" was held sufficient to charge Murder in the
First Degree.

8

In State

ti.

Landrurn, 3 U.2d 372, 284 P.2d 693

( hl55), the appellants contended that the Information

Jiic11 merely charged them with robbing an individual
was not sufficient to comply with Article I, Section 12,
of the Constitution of Utah. The charges were L, H and
11

F robbed S. The Court citing State v. Hill, 100 Utah
IHi P.2d 392 (1941), stated that the Information
wa~ sufficient to comply with the constitutional standard.
J;'lfi,

ln State v. Courtnc.IJ, IO U.2d 200, 350 P.2d GI~

this Court indicated that an Information charging a defendant with the crime of "Assault with a
Deadly YVeapon," the name given the offense by statute,
adequately complied with the Constitution and statutes
of Utah, although it did not follow the suggested statutory form or set forth the elements. In the Courtney
case, this Court stated:
i 1960),

"True, the information before us does not
follow the suggested form prescribed in the Utah
Penal Code. However, while it is desirable that
the information accurately charge an offender,
mere failure to use the exact words of the statute
is not fatal."
Consequently, it is apparent that the Information
in this case was sufficient to jurisdictionally set forth
an 0ffense against the appellant and that he has no basis
for complaint.
The appellant's contentions are, at best, less than
jurisdictional. It is well settled that under these circumstances, unless an appropriate motion is made to chal-

9

lenge the Information prior to trial, any defect in the
Information is waived. Thus, in Abbott, Criminal Trial
Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 75, it is stated:
"All objections to au indictment or information that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense or to give the court jurisdiction are waiYed by failure to challenge the
sufficiency thereof by a motion to quash or hr
a demurrer.''
·
See also People v. Pounds, 168 Cal. App. 2d 756, 336
P.2d 219 (1959); People v. Hornes, 168 Cal. App. 2d
314, 335 P.2d 756 (1959). Section 77-21-43, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, provides that variances and defects
in an information which otherwise charges a crime in
accordance with Section 77-21-8, Utah Code Annotated.
1953, shall not be a basis for acquittal or for other relief.
and further, that no appeal shall afford a basis for relief.
unless the defendant was, m fact, prejudiced in his
defense on the merits.
Based upon the above, it is submitted that thm
is no merit to the appellant's contention that the Infor·
mation was insufficient.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION.
The appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict. It is submitted
that this point is uniquely without substance.
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The eYi<lence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Ward, 10 U.2d 34,
3.J.7 P.id 8ti5. \Vhen so viewed, it is apparent that the
evidence is overwhelming to sustain the appellant's
guilt.

The eYi<lence discloses that Mr. \Vren B. Egan
left the premises of \Vheeler Machinery Company at
approximately 5 :30 p.m. At that time, no one was in
his office or authorized to be in his office except the
janitor. Mr. \Verner P. Christensen testified that he
left the premises of \Vheeler Machinery Company at
approximately 10 :30 p.m. after checking all the doors,
and that no one else was present on the premises at that
time. The night watchman, l\lr. Jack Merrick, testified
that he patroJled the area three or four times prior to
making his entry at 12 :30 p.m. At 10 :30 p.m., as he
passed the premises, the only person he observed was the
janitor. At 11 :15 p.m. he did not see anyone. At the
time Mr. Christensen left, the office of Mr. Egan was
perfectly aJI right, and as he left, he checked the doors
and saw no one around. He testified ( R. 78) :
"Q 'Vhen you left, was there anyone, to your
knowledge, in the area of Wheeler Ma-chinery
Company - when you left at ten-thirty p.m.,
on the night of the 20th of January?

A

Not to my knowledge, Sir."

The appellant was found in the building after the entry
by the night watchman, .Mr. Merrick, hiding in the restroom. Prior to that time, l\Ir. l\Ierrick saw three individ11

uals run from the vicinity to the off ice of ~Ir. Ega::.
He heard pounding coming from inside the off ice atHJ
tools and other implements were found in the offiC'C
The glass surrounding the off ice had been broken and
bricks pulled out of the wall. It is apparent, therefore.
that the appellant made his entry some time after lO::Ju
p.m. and before 12 :30 p.m., the time Mr. Merrick interrupted him. Thus, the burglary was obviously committed
in the nighttime. Section 76-9-7, Utah Code Annotated.
1953, defines the word "nighttime" as being the period
between sunset and sunrise. Since the burglary was
committed in the month of January, there is no questio11
but what sunset occured prior to the time during whicb
the evidence disclosed the appellant made his entr)·.
In State v. Richards, 29 Utah 310, 81 Pac. It~.
this Court noted that evidence that a burglary was enmmitted in the nighttime may be shown by circumstantial
eYidence. The evidence in the instant case is substan·
tially stronger than that before the Court in SMt :
Richards, where the manager did not, in faet, enter the
store until after sunrise, but was in the vicinity and did
not notice anyone entering. In State v. llf anger, 7 C2d
1, 315 P.2d 976 (1957), this Court found that the
evidence of commission of a burglary during the nighttime was sufficient, although there was no direct testimony of anyone discowring the entry before daybreak.
where circumstantial evidence indicated that the jury
could reasonably find the appellant had entered the store
sometime between 2 :00 and 3 :00 a.m. See also State
v. Farnsu.:orth, 13 U.2d 103, 368 P.2d 914 (1962).
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On cross-examination, .Jlr. Egan, who left the store
a' :ipproxima~ely .J :30 p.m., said that it was nighttime
\\ iJCn he left ( R. 69) .
'i-iie ~ec(1ud basis upon which the appellant attacks
lJ:.:· sufficiency of the eYidence is the contention that
tlttrt' ;, no enrlence to show entry. It is obYious that
thtre is no merit to that contention. The appellant was
; 1(!t in the huildmg on the night of the 20th of January,
H!ti.'i. prior to 10 :30 p.m. The janitor did not see any1J11t i11 ti1e building wheu he locked up and the night
11atdunan did not see anyone at II :I5 p.m. when he
made his check. Subsequently, the appellant and his
t'Plllpauions were obserYed in the building at approxi1:iately 1~:30 p.m. Prior to the time the janitor left,
he r:hecked all the doors which appeared to be locked.
LJmequently, it is apparent that the appellant must
'w1e cutered the building through some stealth or force
'ilmetime heh,·een 10 :30 p.m. and I2 :30 p.m. The testim11n~ of Officer Edward Barton was to the effect that
ri()(I!' Xo. 8 was opened and that he could open the door
!:1· u~in;:.(' a pocket knife to push the lock. The jury could
''ell infer from the circumstances showing a secure
premi'e~ and then the presence of the appellant in the
premises and the lack of any explanation as to the basis
'lf their presence that they jimmied the lock or otherwise
gained entrance illegally. Further, ~Ir. Christensen
testified that the door to the Accounting Section of the
offices was locked when he left ..Mr. 'Vren Egan indicated that the door is usuallv locked bv the J. anitor.
r
.
.
.
nder these circumstances, it is apparent that there
13

was a sufficient showing of a breaking. In Clark and
.Marshall, Crimes, 6th E., p. 879 ( 1958), it is stated:
"~he wor~ 'breakin.g' in the definition of burg.
lary IS used ma techmcal, rather than its popular
sense. Any removing or putting aside of something material which constitutes a part of the
~10use,. and .which .is. reli;~ upon as se~urity against
mtrusion, Is sufficient. I hus, there IS a sufficient
breaking if glass is broken or pushed out of a
window or door in order to effect an entrance.
though it may have been cracked, cut, or eren
broken to some extent before. And it is sufficient
if a house is burned in order to enter; if a latch
is lifted; or knob turned, or even if a door, window transom, or trap door, which is entireh·
closed, is pushed open, though it may not b~
locked, or latched, but may be held in place by
a wedge or by its weight only; if a netting or
screen is removed from an otherwise open window; or if a hole is dug under a building, made
of logs resting on the ground, and without a
floor other than the ground. In all of these cases
there is a removing or putting aside of some part
of the house intended as security against intru·
sion, and that is sufficient.

The breaking need not be of an outer door or
window. If a man enters a house without break·
ing, and when in the house unlocks or opens a
closed inner door with felonious intent, and enters.
he is just as guilty as if he had broken an outer
door."
Consequently, under any theory of the evidence, the
appellant was guilty of' burglary, since there was a
breaking ( 1) by the entry into the closed portion of the
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Wheeler property, since the testimony was to the effect
that all doors were closed and the only way the appellant
could have gained entry is by opening the door in some
fashion and ( 2) the evidence of a breaking of an inner
portion of the premises sustains the conviction for burglary. Of course, the evidence of the entry by the appellant is sustained by his presence upon the premises.
The entry of an unlocked door or opening the door
and thereafter closing it is sufficient to sustain a conviction of burglary. 23 A.L.R. ll2. Further, the testimony of all the witnesses for the State indicated that the
premises were secured prior to the time the appellant
gained entrance, thus necessitating a technical breaking
and being circumstantial evidence of such a breaking.
The evidence in this case is as strong as that in State v.
Sullivan, 6 e.2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 {1957), where the
eourt sustained a conviction for burglary. It is well
established that both the breaking and entry can be
established by circumstantial evidence indicating that
the only means by which entry could have been gained
would be through a breaking. People v. Purcell, 22 Cal.
App. 2d 126. 70 P.2d 706 {1937). In People v. Tims,
171 Cal. App. 2d 671, 341 P.2d 56 (1959), the court
noted that the elements of burglary, including the entry,
could be proved by circumstantial evidence. See also
State v. Gatewood, 169 Kan. 679, 221 P.2d 392 {1950).
The appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain an attempt to commit the crime of larceny or other felony. Intent, like any other element
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of tlie nime of burglary, l'.nn be shown by l'.ircum~tanfoJ
evidence. In the instant l'.ase, the appellant awl his co1; 1•
pan ions ,.,·ere a ppareutly in the off ice of the Comptruller
where the safe and vaalt of the 'Vheeler Machinerr
Company is lol'.ated. The nature of the damage appai:ently done by the appellant and his companions in tlie
Acl'.otmting Section of the \Vheeler offices eYidencei
an intent to break into the vault for the purpo~es of
larl'.eny. This sustains an inference of an intent to cummit the crime of larl'.eny. In State v. Gateu:ood, 1· 1111 r11.
the Kansas Supreme Court noted:

"*** If intent must have definite a!1d ~ubstan
tiYe proof it would he almost impossible to c011vict, absent facts di•;dosing a culmination of tlir
intent. The mind of an alleged offender, :rn11ever, may be read from his acts, conduct au<l
inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom.***

*** Numerous cases are cited in a well considered opinion in the Iowa l'.ase holding the dear
weight of authority to be that an unexplained
breaking and entering of a dwelling house in
the nighttime is in itself sufficient to sustain a
verdict that the breaking and entering was done
with the intent to commit larceny rather than
some other f elonv. The Iowa case contains quotations from som.e of the many cases so holding.
which need not be repeated ·here. The f~nda
mental theory upon which the inference.of mtent
to commit larl'.eny is based, absent evHl.ence of
other intent or an explanation for breaking and
entering, is that the usual object or purpose ~f
burglarizing a clwelling house at night is \heft.
'Ve are impressed with the soundness of the
rule."
16

It is apparent, therefore, that there is no insufficiency

of the evidence, so far as the element of intent is concerned. This case is not strikingly different from that
before the court in State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 Pac.
9.50 ( 1029) , where the court found the evidence sufficient to have sustained the jury's verdict.
The appellant cites several cases on page 12 of his
Brief which he argues support the proposition that the
eridence iu this ca<;e is insufficient. An analysis of each
of these case'i discloses that they do not support the
proposition for which the appellant cites them. In State
,. S c7cell, 4!J \Yash. 2d 244, 299 P.2d 517 ( 1956), the
court considered tbe question of whether there was suffil'ient evidence of entry. The court found that there was
no eridence to show entry by the appellant, since there
1rns no e,·i1lence of his presence. Of course, in the instant
ease, the appellant's presence on the premises was established along with other evidence, which would indicate
+hat the only way entrance could have been gained was
by forcing some door or other aperture which otherwise
would have blocked the appellant's entrance.

In People v. Burns, 114 Cal. App. 2d 566, 250
P.2d 619 ( 1952), the court found the evidence insufficient to support a finding of second degree burglary,
because there was no showing that the doors to the
rehicle which was allegedly burglarized were locked, as
distinct from closed. The statute in question required
a showing that the doors were "locked."
In State v. Trombley, 123 'Vash. 514, 232 Pac. 326
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( 1925), the ouly evidence of any burglary having bttn

attempted or committed was a conclusionary stateme,1:
by the owner of the premises involved. There was Hu
evidence to show the presence of the appellant or other
persons on the premises or any showing of any disturb·
ance to the premises or the necessity of disturbance to
have gained entry. This ease has no bearing on the eri·
dence in the instant case.
In State v. Owen, 9-± Ariz. 354<, 38.5 P.2d 22i
( 19G0), the court found that the defendant had permission to go in and out of the service station and. therefore, it eould not be determined that at the time tht
entry into the service station and the removal of the ca;\1
register occurred, the appellant had the required intent.
None of the ea.SC'S eitecl by the appellant support tlip
proposition for whieh they are urged on appeal, nor d1
they in any way support a petition for re\•ersal in th~
instant case. Consequently, there is no basis for remsd
because of an alleged insufficiency of the evidence.

1

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR!~
ALLO\VING OFFICER HARTON TO TEST!·
FY REGARDING HO'V HE ENTERED
THE BUILDING.
At the time of trial, Officer Barton of the Salt
Lake City Police Department testified that on the night
of the 21st of January, 1965, in an attempt to determine

18

ho"· entry was made by the appellant and his companions. he went to door No. 8 at the 'Vheeler premises
and was able to gain entry. The District Attorney asked
him how he gained entrance and he said that he slipped
the bolt to the door with the blade of his pocketknife.
This testimony was over objection. Thereafter, he testitied that it took him a very short period of time to do so.
He also testified that in order to slip the bolt, he took
bold of the handle, pulled the door to him and slid his
pocketknife in tripping the bolt. There was no objection
made to any of the subsequent testimony .
.At the 11utset, it is submitted by the State that the
appellant has not preserved his position on appeal. Only
one objection was made to the questioning of Officer
Barton. Subsequent testimony of a similar nature to
tliat objected ('ame in without any objection being voiced
hr coumel. It is admitted that, normally, repetition of
an (Jb,iection once overruled is not required. However,
the more specific and detailed nature of Officer Barton's
testimony was such that new evidence was, in fact, being
otfered which should h:n-e invoked an objection to preserve it on appeal.

It is submitted that the evidence was clearly
relernnt. At the time Officer Barton attempted to gain
entry, the burglars had just been apprehended. The
premises appeared to be in the same condition as they
were when the burglars were arrested on the premises.
The means by which entry could have been gained was a
matter into which the officer conducting the investiga-
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tion should have made an inquiry. The evidence clearh
supports a showing that the premises were in the sam~
condition as they were immediately prior to the time !Lt
appellant was arrested and in the same condition as
they were when the night watchman left the premise,
except for the inside portion. The easy means by which
entrance could be gained to the premises was direct!)·
reley::mt to showing how the appellant and other persons
possessing normal skills could have gained entrance to
the premises.
The question of the admissibility of evidence is one
in the sound discretion of the trial court. Proof of smrounding conditions and circumstances of the crime ;,
admissible. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed.,
p. 802; McCormick, Evidence, p. 319:
"Relevant evidence then is evidence that i11
some degree advances the inquiry and thus has
probati,re value and is prima facie admissible.
The trial court certainly did not abuse its discretion.
Secondly, it could not be said that the evidence
was in any way so prejudicial as to deprive the appellant
of a fair trial. Harmless error cannot be the basis of n
reversal. Section 77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated, 19.53:
State v. Lake, 57 Utah tH9, 196 Pac. 1015; State"·
Justesen, 35 Utah 105, 99 Pac. 456. It is obvious that
there is no merit to the appellant's point on appeal.
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POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
THE IKSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE
JURY.

The appellant contends that the court erred in
iustructing the jury by using the word "unlawfully" in
its instructions. Respondent is at a complete loss to
understand the appellant's point on appeal. The word
"unlawfully" clearly manifests to the jury the fact that
the entry must be otherwise than with the permission
or in accordance with lawful conduct. In no way could
1t prejudice the appellant's position on appeal. Appellant cites no case that supports his proposition, nor has
t:1e respondent been able to find any.
Further, the appellant did not take exception to
chat portion of the court's instruction at the time of
tnal. At the time of trial, the only exception taken was
lei the term "forcible breaking and entering or through
the unlawful entry of an open door or window without
force in the nighttime," which it was contended was in
conflict with the words "by opening the door or window."
Of course, an opening of a window or door is a forcible
breaking, but, in any event, the appellant did not specify
any claim of error as to the court's use of the word
"unlawful." ObYiously, the issue is not preserved on
appeal.
The appellant's contention that the instructions
are otherwise objectionable is simply absurd. A simple
reading of the instructions demonstrates that they are
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in accordance with statutory and case law in the State
of Utah.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IX
REFUSING TO GIYE THE APPELLANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred
in refusing to give its requested instructions. As part
of appellant's scattergun argument on appeal, it is con·
tended that Instruction No. I requested by the appellant
should have been given. This instruction is merely a
statutory restatement of the elements of burglary. It
was adequately covered in the court's Instructions 4(ai
and ( b). There was no requirement that the appellant
have the instructions given in the same language he
requests. It is sufficient that the court gives an instruction which adequately encompasses the law of the ca5e.
People v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 Pac. 737. In Abbott, Crimi1wl Trial Practice, 4th Ed., p. 1245, it is
stated:
"So, too, as a general rule, the court is not
obliged to give requested instructions i~ the
language precisely as framed and subn;utted.
however correct they may be; but he may, .m he~
thereof, give instructions prepared by lum~elt.
covering, as he views the case, all the questiom
of law presented upon which it is nec~ss.ary and
advisable to instruct the jury, unless 1t 1s other·
wise expressly provided by statute."
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The appellant contends that the lesser included
offenses of third degree burglary and entry for the purpose~ of damaging property were raised by the evidence.
H j~; submitted that there is no merit to either of these
l'.Ontentions.
Third Degree Burglary differs from second degree
burglary only in that the entry need not be in the nighttime. No evidence of any kind in the record supports an
inferrence that the entry in the instant case was made
:it any other time than between 10 :30 p.m., at the time
the janitor checked and secured the premises, and 12 :30
a.m., when the appellant and his companions were discovered. YVl1en )fr. Egan, the Comptroller of Wheeler
Uar-hinery Company, left, he indicated that it was dark.
T'1e appellant and his companions were not on the premises at that time. He did not offer any evidence contrarr to the conclusion that the entry was not made
between 10 :30 p.m. and 12 :30 a.m. Consequently,
there was no evidence by which the jury could have
found the crime of third degree burglary.
The contention that the court should have instructed
upon the crime of entry and the intent to damage property is equally unmeritorious. The evidence of damage
of property by the appellant and his companions shows
that no property outside of the business office area at
the Wheeler Machinery Company building was in any
way damaged. The only damage to the off ice area was
a broken window, apparently for the purpose of gaining
access into the area where the vault and safe were
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located. Damage was not <lone to desks, books, nor 113 ,
any general damage of a malicious or vicious nature
observed. The appellant and his companions knocked
mortar and bricks from the wall apparently for the
purpose of gaining access into the vault. All the action,
of the breaking and damage can have only one pos5iLle
explanation, that of enabling the appellant and his
companions to get into the area where the money
or other valuable possessions of the \Vheeler .Machinery
Company were kept. C nder these circumstances, it h
apparent that there is evidence to show a general attempt
to merely damage or maliciously injure property. On!)· ,
if there was evidence by which the jury could haYe found
that the sole intent of the appellant and his companio111
was to damage property in the interior of the Wheeler
building would such an instruction be appropriate. Iri
this instance, there is no evidence of such a nature.
In a long line of decisions, this court has indicatetl
that there is no need for a trial court to instruct upo11
a lesser included offense unless it is raised by the en·
dence. In State v. Angle, 61 Utah 432, 215 Pac. 531
( 1923) , this court stated:
"It is a well-settled rule that instructions as
to lower grades of the offenses charged shouM
be given when w_arranted by the evidence. It 15
equally well settled that in a criminal .P~osecut 10 ~
error cannot be preclicated on the omission of th
trial court to instruct as to lesser grades of the
· no en'denc: Idto
offense charged '"here there is
reduce the offense to a lesser grade. 1 Blashfie ·
Instructions to Juries ( 2<l Ed.) § 408."
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In State t'. Fcryuson, H Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55 ( 1929),
this court again noted:
"It is a well settled rule that instructions as to
lower grades of the offense charged should be
given when warranted by the evidence. It is
equally well settled that in a criminal prosecution
error cannot be predicated on the omission of the
tri:il court to instruct as to lesser grades of the
offense charged, where there is no evidence to
reduce the offense to a lesser grade."

Uost recently, in State v. Gleason, No. 10289, September 23, 1965, this Court ruled that there was no reason
to instruct upon the lesser included offenses to the crime
of rape. It was stated:
'·The eYidence was so overwhelming that he
committed the act that no such instruction was
either necessary or appropriate."
In the instant case, the evidence is so overwhelming
that the appellant and his companions were bent on
burglary that no instruction upon the lesser included
offense of intent to injure property was warranted.
Consequently, the trial court did not err in not instructing the jury on this item.

POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT ACCESS TO THE PRESENTENCE REPORT PREPARED BY THE
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF ADULT
25

PROBATION AND PAROLE, NOR IS THE
RECORD SUFFICIENT TO PRESENT THE
ISSUE ON APPEAL.
The appellant contends that the trial court violated
his constitutional rights, to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to due process of law, Article J.
Sections 7, 12, Constitution of the State of Utah, Amendments V, VI, and XIV to the Constitution of the Unite11
States of America. The basis of the appellant's conten·
tion is that the trial court erred in refusing the appellant
access to the Presentence Report prepared by the Utah
State Department of Adult Probation and Parole.
At the outset, it should be noted that nowhere in
the record of proceedings in the trial court does it appear
that the appellant, in fact, requested permission to see
the Presentence Report or does the record show appel·
lant was otherwise denied access to the informatio11
contained in the Presentence Report. Since the recorJ
of proceedings in the trial court does not properly prP·
sent the issue to this court, there is no basis for its con·
sideration on appeal.
Even so, it is submitted that there is no merit to the
appellant's contention. In Williams v. New York, 3:li
U.S. 241 ( 1949), the appellant was convicted of murder
in the first degree and sentenced to death. In sentencing
the accused, the judge indicated that he was relying
upon information contained in a report supplied him by
the court's probation department. The appellant con·
tended that the failure to allow him to examine the wit·
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nesses whose statements were contained in the report
was a denial of due process of law and a denial of the
opportunity for confrontation. Before the court was
Section 482 of the New York Criminal Code, which
allowed the judge, prior to pronouncing sentence, to
examine the defendant's previous criminal record and
any mental psychiatric or physical examination reports.
The court noted that both in the American colonies and
in England, judges were given wide discretion in the
sources and types of evidence used to assist them in
determining the type and extent of punishment to be
imposed. The court noted that out-of-court affidavits
have been frequently used in the course of sentencing.
The court stated:
"A sentencing judge, however, is not confined
to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within six
statutorv or constitutional limits is to determine
the type. and extent of punishment after the issue
of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant if not essential - to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life
and characteristics. And modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the
more necessary that a sentencing judge not be
denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to
restrictive rules of evidence prQPerly applicable
to the trial."

The court further noted :
"The practice of probation which relies heavily
on nonjudicial implementation has been accepted
as a wise policy."
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The court observed:
"To deprive sentencing judges of this kind ,
information would undermine modern pen~. ·
l?gical procedural policies that have been cau·
bously adopted throughout the nation after care.
ful con:sideration and experimentation. We musi
recogrnze that most of the information now relied
~pon ?.Y jud?'es to guide them in the intelligent
1mpos1t10n of sentences would be unavailable i!
informati01? were restri~ted to that given in open
court by witnesses subject to cross-examination.
And the modern probation report draws on in·
formation concerning every aspect of a defen.
dant's life. The type and extent of this informa· :
tion make totally impractical if not impossible ·
open court testimony with cross-examination.
1
Such a procedure could endlessly delay criminal
administration in a retrial of collateral issues.
The consideration we have set out admonish us ·
against treating the due-process clause as a uni· \
forrr:i command tI:at courts thr?ughout the 1
N at10n abandon their age-old practice of seekmg
information from out-of-court sources to guidt .
their judgment toward a more enlightened an1l
just sentence.***"

It is submitted, therefore, that there is no basis tr, ·
the contention that there is a denial of due process of lair
for the right to confrontation. The courts have generall\
ruled that the matter rests in the sound discretion of the
trial court. United States v. Schwenke, 221 F.2d 356.
( 2nd Cir., 1955); State v. Moore, 49 Del. 29, 108 A.Zd ·
1
675 (1954); State v. Benes, 16 N.J. 389, 108 A.2 d 8~f 1
(1954); Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750 (5tli
1

1
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T~e following addition to the respondent's brief is submitted for insertion at
the end of the first quoted paragraph on page
29. The additional insertion is based upon
information discovered subsequent to the submission of the respondent's reply brief.

In Morgan v. State, 142 So.2d 308 (Fla.
court of Appeals, 1962) , the defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying
him an opportunity to see the presentencing
report submitted by Florida authorities to
the sentencing judge subsequent to the defendant's conviction.
It was contended that the
denial of access to the report violated his
right to confront witnesses against him and
his right of cross-examination. The Florida
court denied the contention, relying upon the
case of People v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503
(D. c. 1960), and United States v. Greathouse,
188 F. Supp. 765 (D. c. 1960).
The case is
noted in 5 Ariz. Law Review 127 (1964), wherein it is acknowledged that the case is in
accord with the weight of authority.
Certiorari in the case was denied by the Florida
Supreme Court, 146 So.2d 751.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
,.
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C.r. 1955). In People v. Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503
;D. c. 1960), it was stated:

"It is not the pra~ice to permit the defendant
or his counsel or anyone else to inspect reports
of presentence investigations. Such reports are
treated as confidential documents***. In fact,
it has been a traditional practice even before the
system of presentence investigation was introduced for the court to receive information in copfidence, which the court might or might not disclose to the defendant, as the court saw fit, that
might bear upon the question of what sentence
should be imposed. The custom of treating reports as confidential documents is merely a continuation of that prior practice."
From what has been said above, it is clear that there
is no constitutional violation, insofar as due process is
concerned, in not allowing a defendant to examine the
presentence investigation report, nor can there by any
claim of a denial of confrontation in the instant case.
First, there no showing that the probationary report
was adverse to the appellant. Second, the appellant had
been convicted; all witnesses relevant to the question
of guilt and innocence had already testified. The information considered by the court imposing sentence is
information related to an appropriate disposition of the
case on the theory of what will best protect society and
what will best lead to the rehabilitation of the defendant.
None of this need be in an adversary climate, fVillimns
V. New York, supra. Consequently, it cannot be said
that the appellant has been denied any constitutional
29

rights. In Keve, A Probation Officer Investigates, p.;
1960, it is stated:
"It m_u~t be said that as of now the effect
legal opmron supports ~he confidentiality of(!.
report and allows the Judge to use it free)r .
determining the sentence without allowing'!
defendant to examine it."
1.

There is a substantial need for the confidentialit;
of the Presentence Report. In Roche, The Position 1,'.
Confidentiality of the Pre-Sentence Investigation Ri
port, 29 Albany L. Rev. 206, it is noted that the pn
sentence investigation report is for the purpose of gair
ing insight and guidance into the individual charac!r
of the person and to determine an appropriate dispP·
tion. Probation officers must often obtain informa!it
concerning the background and character of an indir
ual, which if the information was to be disclosed, wou.
not be available. Roche notes that the element of Im·
and confidence is basic to the presentence report. In :1·
article written by Judge Hincks (Hincks, In Op11oi1
tion to Rule 84C-1, F. Prob. 1944) it is stated:
"In the first place, the report being designatt·
as an aid to the judge will contain an intima~i
character sketch of the defendant. Often it id
be hurtful to the defendant's morale - to :v
regenerative effort - to see that portrai~. I.dour
if it is the practice of competent psychiatr1sts t
disclose the details of their diagnosis to th~ pa
tients, nor do I consider such a practice wtSe ~
the field of penology. Even though the defendani
1
be not actually psychopathic, his soci~l attil~;.
will often be so warped that a reading of ·
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report would tend further to disturb his orientation. Neither bitterness nor self-pity are helpful
aids to rehabilitation."
Oufr one case has been found where a court has said
tliat it wa~ mandatory for a defendant to be allowed
to examine the presentence report. In Regina v. Benson, 100 C.C.C. 247, 13 C.R. 1 (B.C. 1951), the British
Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant
should be entitled to be confronted with the evidence
against him in a presentence report. It is submitted that
the better reasoned cases simply do not support the
proposition that the defendant has an absolute right to
examine the presentence report. In 7 The Criminal Law
(~uarterly, p. 320, 1964-65, it is observed:
"The sources of information available to the
probation officer would speedily dry up if it became known that there might be disclosure of the
nature of the relationship between client and
social agency; family statements of problems
such as infidelity, illegitimacy, intimate behavior
patterns and conflict; employment assessments
regarding absenteeism, use of alcohol or competence; data from clinical sources which may
cut through the defences which a person uses to
live with and rationalize his behaviour and which,
if destroyed, may cause denial, hostility or further intensification of his behavioural problem
and its expression."
It is apparent, therefore, that in the instant case
the appellant has no basis to contend that he should
have been granted probation or that his rights were in
any way Yiolated during the sentencing procedure.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence in the instant case clearly support t~
trial court's judgment of the appellant's guilt. T~
instructions given by the court adequately appraise!~
jury of the elements of the offense. The appellanf1
contentions that the information was faulty, the eviden~
insufficient, the instructions erroneous, and the other
sundry items claimed as a basis for reversal are at be!!
a sea ttergun attack, having no merit when put to the ter.
of analysis. This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

Attorney for Respondenr
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